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Beyond ethics: Conscience, pacifism, and the political in wartime Britain  
Tobias KELLY 
HAU: JOURNAL OF ETHNOGRAPHIC THEORY 8(1) 
 
Abstract: The central intervention of this article concerns the contingency of the relationship between 
ethics and politics. The empirical focus is Second World War Britain, where the refusal to fight was 
often framed as a conscientious objection. More broadly, one of the central propositions in the 
anthropology of ethics has been that ethics is ubiquitous. However, ethical practices— such as 
conscience— are not always prioritized in public life. It is not simply, for example, that we might have 
different ways of answering “ how ought I to live?” , but that the question itself is not always thought 
to be socially significant. We therefore need to pay attention to how and why the question is posed, and 
what this means for who can speak and about what issues. As such, the paper argues that the 
valorization of conscience can reproduce forms of privilege. 
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Introduction 
In the summer of 1940 Fred Urquhart stood before a tribunal in Edinburgh and argued 
that he should be exempted from military service on the grounds of conscience. 
Urquhart was the 28-year-old son of working-class parents from the southwest coast 
of Scotland. Standing before the tribunal, he said that he objected to war on 
“humanitarian” grounds, because it was “the greatest of all evils….”1 As the Nazis 
occupied much of mainland Europe, and the Luftwaffe bombed London, Bristol, and 
Glasgow, British citizens were mobilized to fight on a scale never seen before or 
since. However, close to 60,000 people, Fred Urquhart included, would claim legal 
exemption from fighting on the grounds that they held a “conscientious objection” to 
military service.  
Claims of conscience have been wider than those who object to taking part in 
war, including, for example, a refusal to swear oaths or to undergo vaccination. 
Abortion laws have also routinely included the right for medical practitioners to 
exempt themselves on the ground of conscience. More recently, debates over same-
sex marriage have involved attempts by parts of the religious right to refuse to 
participate in the name of conscience. In all these cases, conscience has been used to 
try and carve out a space of opposition in the name of ethical conviction. Whilst for 
much of the twentieth century claims of conscience were often associated with the 
broadly liberal left, by the early twentieth century the issue seems to be currently                                                         
1 Fred Urquhart, Report of Appellate Tribunal, November 7, 1940; letter from Gordon Stott, July 30, 
1940; letter from Gordon Stott to Fred Urquhart, August 2, 1940 (papers of Fred Urquhart, collection 
of Colin Affleck). 
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dominated by Christian conservatives (Kelly 2018). Either way, British conscientious 
objectors of the Second World represent one of the largest ever groups of people 
claiming exemptions in the name of conscience. But refusing to fight fascism has for 
many people deeply ambiguous, even problematic, implications. These people 
therefore provide an illuminating point of entry to explore the potentials and 
limitations of forms of dissent made in its name.  
Within the broad history of liberal democracies such as Britain, conscience 
has been seen as a distinctively ethical category (see, for example, Walzer 1970; 
Foucault 1997, 223; Nussbaum 2008; Maclure and Taylor 2012). The philosopher 
John Rawls went to so far as to say that liberty of conscience is at the historical and 
normative core of “political liberalism” (1993, 154). Conscience has also been 
understood as the basis for action in both the civil rights and human rights movements 
(King 1967). In this vision, it grounds a form of personhood that stands alongside the 
seemingly more calculative, instrumental, and self-interested actor (Muehlebach 
2012, 20–30). Or to put this another way, conscience helps tell a person what they 
ought to do—and how they should (hopefully) act for the good—in moments of 
extreme duress. As such, it can be seen as lying at the heart of a particular sense of 
liberal moral personhood. 
Despite the centrality of conscience in the history of self-consciously liberal 
politics and societies, there is nothing self-evident about the importance placed in 
conscience, the issues it focuses on, or the forms it is thought to take. Historically, 
conscience has been understood as a quality of all humanity, an insight reserved for 
the select few, a form of religious faith, and a type of secular conviction, amongst 
others (Rawls 1993; Andrew 2001; Critchley 2007; Nussbaum 2008; Maclure and 
Taylor 2012). If conscience is central to liberal visions of what it means to be human, 
its precise meaning, form, and focus are therefore historically varied. It is also 
important to note that there are alternative and important traditions of conscience that 
have run through and past those of liberalism (Mehta 2013; Weiss 2014). Either way, 
in Britain at least, claims of conscience became particularly important during the 
Protestant Reformation, where the focus shifted from a supposedly objective basis in 
the word of God or the teachings of the Church, toward an emphasis on the internal 
reflections of a self-centered agent (Walzer 1970). In this process, conscience became 
a key category through which religious faith, tolerance, and the power of the state 
were mediated.  
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The central analytical intervention of this article concerns the social 
contingency of ethical practices. The philosopher Raymond Geuss has argued that 
philosophical ethics has been structured around a small set of questions (2002). In 
particular, Anglo-American writing has often assumed that the basic ethical situation 
was one in which people asked themselves “what ought I to do?” (2003, 30). Much of 
the anthropology of ethics has had a similar question at it center, even if it has debated 
how and where the question is posed (Lambek 2010, 2; Laidlaw 2014, 112; Mattingly 
2014, 28; Venkatasen 2015). At first glance, issues of conscience would seem to be 
prime material for such an approach. But for Geuss, the significance of such questions 
should not be taken for granted, as they have a very specific and narrow history 
(2003, 43). Geuss is a philosopher and responds by looking for other philosophical 
traditions “outside ethics” to understand what might be important in human life 
(2003). We can also respond, though in a different and perhaps more anthropological 
manner, by asking how is that this question comes to be posed at all? It is not simply 
that we might have different ways of answering the “how ought I to live?” question, 
but that the question itself—particularly when asked in the first person—is not always 
thought to be socially important. The matter of how issues become subject to ethical 
reflection has been a central theme in the anthropology of ethics (Robbins 2004; 
Lambek 2015; Das 2016; Keane 2016). This paper, however, reverses that question to 
examine how ethics itself becomes seen as socially significant, and with what 
implications?  
One of the central propositions in the anthropology of ethics has been that 
ethics is ubiquitous or irreducible (Laidlaw 2014, 2, 44–5; Keane 2016, 6). This might 
be true. However, ethical claims are not always socially significant. Social 
significance can be thought about in many ways. But conscience takes on a particular 
salience in the context of attempts by liberal regimes to regulate the forms of 
conviction that are seen as having a legitimate place in public life (Brown 2006; 
Maclure and Taylor 2012; Mahmood 2012). We should of course be careful not to 
take the public itself for granted, but rather see it as the unequal, contested, but also 
shared spaces through which people identify, discuss, and address what are seen as 
issues of mutual concern (Gal 2002; Warner 2002; Engelke 2013). In such a context, 
as in others, ethics is not the only way we can address questions of mutual concern. 
Ethical practices might have to compete and overlap with those based on technical 
expertise, necessity, reason, and passion, amongst other things (Brown 2015). And 
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when an issue is framed in ethical terms, it has implications for who is allowed to 
speak, and what they can speak about.  
In this article, therefore, I examine what and who liberal democracies protect 
when they single out conscience. As such, the article can be seen as part of the 
anthropology of actually existing liberalism, where liberalism is understood as a 
culturally thick, varied, and historically contingent set of discourses and practices 
(Muehlebach 2012; Weiss 2014). Within the context of such actually existing 
liberalisms, my central argument is that claims of conscience can reproduce narrow 
forms of privilege. Liberal regimes have often promoted conscience as a neutral 
concept, speaking directly to what it means to be human in the most general sense. 
Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor have argued, for example, that freedom of 
conscience provides a neutral way of respecting individual moral autonomy and 
equality (2012). However, turning an issue of who should kill and be killed in the 
name of the state into one of the ability to persuade others of the sincerity of 
individual scruples can also reproduce very specific inequalities. Specifically, in 
Second World War Britain, successful claims of conscience were most likely to come 
from those whose arguments resonated with the history of tempered protestant 
convictions.  
More broadly, this article seeks to contribute to debates about the relationship 
between ethics and politics. As Erica Weiss has perceptively argued in relation to 
Israel, that conscience can serve to reduce the space for engaging “politically on 
questions of military service and violence” (2012, 82). In Second World War Britain 
too, arguments from conscience pushed to one side issues of collective solidarity and 
inequality in the use of violence. Such an argument can be seen as part of the well-
established “anti-politics” repertoire within anthropology (Ferguson 1994; Li 2007). It 
also speaks to broader debate about the tendency to moralize replacing forms of 
political action (Mouffe 2000a; Brown 2006). But as Miriam Ticktin has also pointed 
out, ethical claims can themselves also involve specific forms of politics (2006). We 
therefore need to think through the relationship between ethics and politics in the 
context of specific histories and struggles. This can involve taking a step back from 
abstract definitions of both ethics and politics, to examine the role of specific 
practices in shaping the types of actor and action that are seen to have a persuasive 
role in public life. 
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The article draws on the letters, diaries, and documents of British 
conscientious objectors. These documents should all be read as forms of justification 
and persuasion aimed at both the people who wrote them and others. The traces left 
behind in the archive are “as contingent, contested and contradictory as life outside 
the archive” (Dirks 2015, 46; see also Stanley 2004). This means interpreting both 
what is there and what is not, either because it went without saying, or because it 
could or should not be said. The article begins with a discussion of the relationship of 
ethics and politics. It then moves on to examine the life of one particular 
conscientious objector, Fred Urquhart, with whom this paper started. The focus on 
one person does two things. The first is to explore the relationship between the 
individualizing claims of conscience and the reproduction of particular social 
relationships. The second is to examine how ethical claims emerge in more or less 
public form, without treating this process as entirely top down. Such an approach 
allows us to take ethical practices seriously, but also at the same time to examine their 
conditions of possibility. The hope is to capture both the larger sweep of history and 
the experiences of lives as they are lived. 
 
The questions of ethics and politics 
At one level, it is hard to imagine a politics without ethics and an ethics without 
politics. As Simon Critchley writes “if ethics without politics is empty, then politics 
without ethics is blind” (2007, 120). Ethical practices have been understood in some 
circumstances as deeply political, even radical (Ticktin 2006; Dave 2012; Wright 
2016). However, one prominent stream in the anthropology of ethics has also 
repeatedly stressed the difference between ethics and politics (Lambek 2015, 115; 
Keane 2016, 187; Laidlaw 2016, 23). At the same time, the anthropological turn to 
ethics has itself been accused by critics of being “apolitical” (Fassin 2012; Ortner 
2016). Given these different positions, it might seem obvious that very different 
notions of both ethics and politics are at play. To say that ethical practices can be 
“depoliticizing” therefore implies a particular understanding of both. As such, we 
need to be specific about what we mean by both ethics and politics.  
Anthropologists have described a wide variety of very different practices that 
have been labeled as ethical, ranging from the phenomenological to the abstract, from 
the individual to the collective (see, for example, Das 2014, 492; Zigon and Throop 
2014; Al-Mohammad 2015). At an empirical level though, claims of conscience in 
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mid-twentieth-century Britain speak most directly to a particular understanding of 
ethics as “reflective freedom” (Foucault 1997, 300; Faubion 2011, 36; Laidlaw 2014). 
This is a form of ethics understood as a self-conscious taking a step back to evaluate 
the implications and possibilities of particular practices. This is not to say this is the 
only way of understanding ethics, but that it is one that resonates with practices 
around conscientious objection. It is also worth noting—before we might be tempted 
to generalize its assumptions—that “reflective freedom” also seems to closely 
resonate with a particular set of liberal institutions and sensibilities.  
But, what about politics? It is necessary to note that no one seems to be saying 
that ethics and politics are inherently distinct, but rather that they are simply not 
reducible to one another. The stream of the anthropology of ethics that has stressed 
reflection has also overlapped with one which sets itself off against an understanding 
of politics as linked to instrumental and calculative forms of action (Lambek 2010, 2; 
Laidlaw 2014, 7; Venkatesan 2015; Keane 2016). Such an understanding of ethics is 
also being contrasted with an all-inclusive domineering form of power (Laidlaw 2014, 
7; Mattingly 2014). In part, this can be seen as a rejection of an approach that sees the 
making of ethical subjects as a process of discipline and subjugation. However, whilst 
some of these criticisms are well taken, they also have their own limits. More 
specifically, anthropologists have used many different approaches when 
understanding political issues (see, for example, Spencer 2007; de la Cadena 2010; 
Ticktin 2011; Simpson 2014; Wright 2016). There is therefore a danger of throwing 
the political baby out with the instrumental or disciplining bathwater. 
One possible approach is simply to treat politics as an ethnographic category, 
and to see where and how people apply these labels (Spencer 1997; Candea 2011). At 
its best this allows us to escape restrictive a priori definitions, but also to move 
beyond simply seeing politics everywhere, by creating a space for understanding how 
politics takes shape and gains meaning in people’s lives. However, when such 
analysis sticks too closely to the ethnographic ground, it can also result in a 
potentially one-dimensional analytical strategy, limiting the room for critique in favor 
of description.  
It is through an attempt to keep some critical purchase that many 
anthropologists have become interested in the notion of “the political” (Spencer 2007; 
de la Cadena 2010; Ticktin 2011). Influenced by the work of Chantal Mouffe and 
Jacques Rancière, amongst others, “the political” is often understood in terms of 
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dissensus, antagonism, agonism, or dispute (Mouffe 2000b; Rancière 2001). Such a 
notion of “the political” can help draw attention to the ways in which conflict is 
opened up or closed down, and how distinct forms of hierarchy are challenged or 
reproduced in the ways in which we live together (Arendt 1990; Mouffe 2000b). 
However, as Lois McNay has also argued, when treated as an autonomous realm with 
its own logic—its own ontology even—“the political” can also become “socially 
weightless,” divorced from the concrete actors linked to class, gender or race that are 
constitutive of many people’s lives (2014). Our understanding of “the political” 
therefore needs to be placed back into the flux and flow of social relations. 
Rather than trying to draw lines in the sand by defining politics or ethics as 
this or that, it is perhaps more useful to put the two alongside one another. This means 
leaving to one side issues of definition, to focus on the particular substantive 
questions often associated with the anthropologies of ethics and politics. Questions, 
for example, around right and wrong, good and bad, obligation and duty, can be 
placed alongside a concern with the reproduction of conflict, hierarchy, and collective 
life. It is not that one is context and the other content, or one figure and the other 
ground, but rather that they can be mutually constitutive of one another. Indeed, these 
are questions that can and perhaps should be asked at the same time. We might ask 
how, for example, does the valorization of ethical reflection on the question of who 
should or should not fight in a time of war, reproduce or challenge particular forms of 
privilege?  
 
Opposing war from the left 
Fred Urquhart left school at fifteen and found work in an Edinburgh bookshop. In his 
early twenties he resigned to become a full-time writer. Urquhart’s early stories of 
working-class Scottish life received positive reviews, but sales were limited, and he 
had to scrape by on various odd jobs. Urquhart’s father was a socially conservative 
former driver for a Scottish aristocrat, and the relationship between parent and son 
was often strained, in part over the son’s professed Communist sympathies. They 
never fell out completely though, and Urquhart would continue to send his parents’ 
money every few weeks for what he described as their “gin.” After moving to 
Edinburgh, Urquhart lived in one of the small and crowded houses that stood along 
Edinburgh’s semi-industrial waterfront. He was also part of an anti-war movement 
that was widespread across Britain (Ceadel 1980). The Peace Pledge Union, for 
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example, was led by the Canon of St Paul’s Cathedral, Dick Shepherd, with members 
stating that “I renounce war, and am therefore determined not to support any kind of 
war.” The League of Nations Union campaigned for a “permanent peace between 
nations.” These were two of the largest mass movements in Britain in the 1930s, and 
between them had well over half a million members at their respective peaks. 
Throughout the late 1930s and 1940s, Urquhart was anxious about being 
exposed as a homosexual. During this period, he ripped out all the pages of his diaries 
that referred to his sexual encounters after some friends were arrested. At the same 
time though, he also chided himself for a lack of sexual bravery. He copied down in 
his diary a line from a novel by Eric Linklater, a fellow Scottish writer: “Mentally I 
am free thinking, promiscuous, free loving, but physically I am a Victorian.”2  
One of the consistent threads that can be read in Urquhart’s diary is left-wing 
politics. Given his professed loyalties to the international working class, Urquhart’s 
father often accused him of being unpatriotic. Urquhart would write in his diary that 
“He doesn’t seem to realise that it doesn’t matter what country you belong to, if you 
are one of the working classes, you will always get it in the neck… It is hopeless to 
point out to him that we have more in common with the working people of Germany 
than we have with the aristocrats who he admires so much.”3  
Fred Urquhart would spend much of his free time reading periodicals such as 
Left Review, and would send his short stories to socialist magazines. Throughout the 
1930s, he saw the impeding war as a direct result of class exploitation and would also 
dream of moving to the Soviet Union.4 Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, he 
would write that “this war is being used as a method to crush the working class… 
every working class liberty is gradually being taken away… they will realise only 
when it is too late… and the screw of slavery has then firmly taken its grip…”5 
During this time, Urquhart often stayed with his friend Mary Litchfield, a Communist 
and teacher in a small working-class town in Fife, to the northeast of Edinburgh. At 
one point the police raided the house. Urquhart and Litchfield were later told they had 
been reported as possible “fifth columnists,” due to their large number of visitors, 
mainly members of the Fife Labour Party. 
                                                        
2 Fred Urquhart, Diary, September 15, 1932 (papers of Fred Urquhart, Edinburgh University Library). 
3 Diary, October 25, 1939, Urquhart. 
4 Diary, October 21, 1939, Urquhart. 
5 Diary, October 26, 1939, Urquhart. 
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Scotland, and the Clyde valley and Fife in particular, was a center of left-wing 
anti-militarism throughout the 1930s, with strong socialist, communist and anarchist 
streams. Fife, where Urquhart spent much of his time when away from Edinburgh, 
returned a Communist member of parliament in the 1930s. In the First World War, 
working-class internationalism had been a key part of the anti-war movement, 
opposing what it saw as capitalist and imperialist forms of destruction. However, 
Urquhart’s friend Mary Litchfield was convinced that defeating fascism was more 
important than anti-militarist principles and allegiance to the Communist Party. 
Litchfield tried to persuade Urquhart—seemingly causing some strain in the 
relationship—that he would be better off in the army than “cooped up in jail without 
enough to eat and nothing to smoke.”6 Urquhart, though, wrote that he would “stick to 
my guns (funny phrase for a pacifist!). I hate war and I will not take part in any war, 
whether anti-fascist or not.”7  
By 1939, war seemed inevitable to many people in Britain, even those who 
vehemently opposed it. The day hostilities were declared—September 3, 1939—all 
male British citizens between the ages of 18 and 41 were made liable for conscription. 
With the possibility of his own military service imminent, Urquhart tried 
unsuccessfully to get signed off by a doctor for an “enlarged heart.”8 Alongside his 
socialism, Urquhart’s opposition to military service should also be seen against a 
concern with his fledgling writing career. In practice, it was an interest in literature, 
rather than the outbreak of war, that filled most of his diaries. Indeed, he would write 
that a “writer to be a great writer must suffer, but I do not see why he should suffer 
needlessly, as for instance in the army.”9 He wrote that his best course of action was 
to get “some job in the army where I can be safe.”10 Urquhart turned his hopes toward 
a job with the Ministry of Food, but for reasons that are not clear, they would not take 
him. Urquhart was advised to register as a conscientious objector by a friend.11 If he 
did not want to fight, this seemed to be the only space left.  
 
A very short history of conscription and conscience 
                                                        
6 Diary, August 5, 1940, Urquhart. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Diary, September 30, 1939, Urquhart. 
9 Diary, September 30, 1939, Urquhart. 
10 Diary, September 19, 1939, Urquhart. 
11 Ibid. 
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How was it that making a claim of conscience came to be a publicly recognized way 
of refusing to fight? Unlike many of the countries on mainland Europe, the British 
state has historically avoided compulsory universal military service. During the First 
World War, for example, a conscript army was initially opposed by Liberal politicians 
who argued that the free market was practically and morally the best way to produce a 
fighting force; trade unions who supported the war but opposed forced labor; 
socialists who objected to capitalist and imperialist wars, but not all war; and absolute 
pacifists, who predominantly came from various shades of protestant dissent, most 
notably the Quakers.12  
By 1916 though, the British military was increasingly short of the necessary 
recruits. In order for the law on conscription to pass through parliament, an exemption 
on the grounds of conscience was created. What this clause meant differed according 
to party political perspective. To win over Conservative votes, it was argued that the 
clause was part of a “long tradition of British liberty.” And to win over Liberal and 
Labour votes, which included atheists and “free-thinkers,” no definition of conscience 
was included at all (Rae 1970). The British conscience clause was therefore different 
from the one in the US, which was linked to membership of recognized “Peace 
Churches” (Brock 2006). Conscription—and the conscience clause—was not 
introduced in Ireland and the colonies, seemingly out of fear of a lack of loyalty. 
Women, wherever they were, were exempted altogether. Over the course of the First 
World War, 16,000 British citizens were given exemption on the grounds of 
conscience; but over 6,000 were also imprisoned after their applications were denied 
and they refused to go into the military (Rae 1970). The anti-militarist left was 
particularly prominent amongst those who campaigned against conscription, and 
many of them were sent to jail.   
Conscription ended in 1920 but was reintroduced in the runup to the Second 
World War. However, some of the leading conscientious objectors from the First 
World War, and in particular those from the left, were now senior elected politicians, 
with at least three serving in the war-time government. The Spanish Civil War of 
1936–39 had put the pacifist left under severe stress, and many of them decided that it 
was necessary to take up arms against fascism. In the first few years of the Second 
World War—in the context of the Nazi–Soviet pact—the Communist Party of Great                                                         
12 Independent Labour Party. n.d. Why We Oppose Conscription. London. 
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Britain was officially against fighting Germany. Their policy changed though after the 
Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. Small numbers of revolutionary socialists and 
anarchists, particularly in industrial Scotland, remained opposed to both conscription 
and the war. But it would be broadly Christian pacifists, of various hues, who would 
come to dominate public opposition to war.  
Conscientious objectors had a very different experience in 1939 than they did 
in the First World War. This time around, the British government and military were 
reluctant to demand that people fought against their will. As Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlain put it in the runup to the war, “in the Great War ... I think we found that 
it was both useless and an exasperating waste of time and effort to attempt to force 
such people to act in a manner which is contrary to their principles.”13 Tribunals were 
established, which could grant absolute exemption, a conditional exemption, or 
dismiss the application all together (Kelly 2014). For the first time, in 1941, women 
could be conscripted into auxiliary units, although they were never obliged to carry 
arms. Married women or women with children under the age of fourteen were exempt 
altogether.  
British politicians and government officials were publicly proud of the 
conscience clause, seeing it as marking the difference between British democracy and 
European fascism (Kelly 2014). Lord Beveridge, for example, declared in a radio 
broadcast, “Admission of the right of conscientious objection to serve in war is the 
extreme case of British freedom. Nor have I any doubt that it makes Britain stronger 
in war rather than weaker” (Hayes 1949, 6). Winston Churchill would similarly say in 
parliament that “the rights which have been granted in this war and the last to 
conscientious objectors are well known, and are a definite part of British policy. 
Anything in the nature of persecution, victimization, or man-hunting is odious to the 
British people.”14  
As well as an issue of professed principle, conscientious objection should also 
be seen as an administrative and legal compromise that helped to mediate competing 
ideological positions and practical problems. It allowed Conservatives, Liberals, and 
Socialists, for example, to all agree to conscription, and created a way of dealing with 
those people who refused to fight. In one sense then, the legal category of conscience 
can be seen as a black box into which compromise and tensions over who should fight                                                         
13 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, May 4, 1939. 
14 “A Plea for Tolerance,” Central Board of Conscientious Objectors. Butler papers, Bishopsgate. 
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were displaced. And in doing so, questions about the distribution of who should kill 
and die for King and Country were turned into questions of sincere internal 
convictions (Muehlebach 2012; khanna 2017). In the debate about who could refuse 
to fight in a time of war, individual scruples were given particular weight. It is 
perfectly possible that conscience could lead people to taking up arms against 
fascism, and there even many former conscientious objectors who later in the war 
came to this conclusion (see, for example: Morris 1948). However, in public debate in 
wartime Britain, conscientious objection became predominantly associated with the 
legal rights of those who refused to fight. And it was in the legal space opened up by 
these compromises and tensions that Urquhart’s claim of conscience took place.  
 
Making Public 
Urquhart’s reluctance to join the armed forces should be seen as part of a broader 
pattern, and not only amongst those who were open about their pacifist views. Across 
the British population, historians have noted a widespread, if somewhat resigned, 
reluctance to take up arms (Harris 1992). It is also important to note that there were 
other ways of refusing to fight that did not require registering as a conscientious 
objector and appearing before the tribunal. As in any war, the majority of military 
posts did not involve direct involvement in fighting, but were in logistics, 
planning, medical care, or engineering, for example. There were also reserved 
occupations, which at various times included miners, farm workers, accountants, 
tailors, and dentists, amongst others.15 It was also possible to gain exemption on 
medical grounds. According to one estimate, in 1943 alone over 300,000 people 
were discharged for health reasons (Calder 1993, 336).  
Those people who eventually registered as conscientious objectors were 
probably only a very small minority of all those who were reluctant to fight, and 
many of them would have considered other options before doing so. The numbers of 
people applying for military exemption on grounds of conscience ranged from 2.2 
percent of those conscripted in October 1939, to 0.57 percent by mid-1940 (Barker 
1982). In the popular imagination of the time, conscientious objectors came from the 
                                                        
15 See, for example, Schedule of Occupations (Provisional), Ministry of Labour, January 1939. 
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intellectual middle classes.16 Quakers and Methodists were also particularly 
prominent, but there were also some socialists and secular humanitarians.  
One of the things that marked out conscientious objectors, when they 
eventually decided to register, was the public nature of their claim. Writing several 
decades after the Second World War, Hannah Arendt argued that any society that tries 
to prioritize individual interior forms of conscience faces the problem of how to make 
that conscience publicly persuasive to others (1972). Making claims of conscience—
as “sincere and genuine”—therefore involves what Webb Keane has called “a certain 
kind of public accountability” (2002, 75). The crucial point here though is the process 
of making public—of making a conscientious response to the question of “what ought 
I to do?” persuasive to a wider audience. As such, claims of conscience can be seen as 
a performance for public recognition (Kelly 2014; Weiss 2014). The next part of this 
paper will examine how and why such claims for recognition came about.  
 
The coming of conscience 
If conscience, in form or content, is never self-evident, what were the conditions that 
led to the search for public recognition? And how—for the people making claims in 
its name—did this recognition displace or transform other ways of approaching the 
question of who should fight, and why they should do so? How did it come to be that 
for people like Fred Urquhart ethical reflection was seen as the appropriate way of 
approaching the question of whether one should fight or not? How did conscience 
emerge from the overlapping entanglements of socialist solidarity, sexual desire, 
personal ambition, and intimate loyalties of friends and family, to be the most 
publicly significant way to refuse to fight? 
Many of the people who sought registration as conscientious objectors were 
pacifists throughout the 1930s.17 Others though—and Urquhart seems to have been 
among them—came to pacifism, as opposed to anti-militarism, slowly as the war 
neared and they considered its implications.18 Fred Urquhart’s pacifism seems to have 
been formed through intense reading and discussions with his friend Mary Litchfield. 
                                                        
16 Jobs of COs. April 3, 1940. Mass Observation Archives (MOA), University of Sussex, OA TC6 Box 
1 File A 11 Report on COs, July 1940. MOA TC6 Box 1 File A. 
17 See, for example, interviews with Ronald Jeffery and William Elliot, Imperial War Museum Sound 
Archive (IWMSA). 
18 See, for example, private papers of R. Foster, Imperial War Museum Archive (IWMA). 
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Many other people also came to articulate their pacifism through discussions with 
small groups of friends and local pacifist groups.19  
But pacifism—in both its anti-militarist, left-wing, and absolutist forms—is 
one thing. Framing this as an issue of conscience takes a further step. One of the 
interesting things on reading the contemporary diaries and letters of the people who 
sought registration as conscientious objectors is how little the word “conscience” is 
actually mentioned.20 As with Fred Urquhart, there is lots of anxiety about personal 
courage, and concerns about what friends, families, and neighbors will say. There is 
also careful consideration of what military service might mean for collective, and 
personal life after the war ended. For those on the left, the question of whether the 
war was an imperialist continuation of the First World War, and the possible greater 
threat in the face of fascism, were constant issues. People such as Urquhart were also 
concerned, at various times, with the way fear was driving their actions, the 
increasing deprivation of working-class freedom, how to produce good art, how to get 
a job away from the front line, and whether ailments might qualify for a medical 
exemption, amongst many other things. Conscience was not the inevitable response to 
any of these concerns. The word “conscience” was certainly in circulation, used to 
describe principles and convictions, but it had to compete with plenty of others, such 
as duty, solidarity, love, necessity, reason, fear, and faith, when it came to the ways in 
which people described their position in relation to violence.  
Importantly, when conscience is mentioned, it was rarely, if ever, clear-cut. 
Urquhart was not alone in having his uncertainties and dilemmas. In worrying about 
their responsibilities to families and friends, many conscientious objectors were also 
concerned with whether refusing to fight was simply condemning other people to 
death, perhaps their own brothers, and whether by taking up alternative forms of 
service, such as working on a farm, they were simply participating in the war by 
others means. In the popular imagination, conscience is widely associated with a 
forthright and absolute conviction, of the “here I stand; I can do no other” variety. For 
the philosopher Michael Walzer, for example, writing at the time of the Vietnam War, 
claims of conscience should be accepted if they follow a “consistent pattern of 
commitment” (1970, 141). Yet, this seems to speak directly against the ways in which 
British conscientious objectors came to understand conscience. For people who                                                         
19 Interviews with Jesse Hillman, Phillip Dransfield, and Leonard Bird, IWMSA. 
20 See, for example, papers of C. Ruffoni, IWMA. 
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claimed exemption on the grounds of conscience, their convictions were often 
uncertain, not least to themselves. Conscience was all too often uncomfortable, guilty, 
and divided.  
It is not entirely clear from his diaries why Urquhart finally decided to register 
as a conscientious objector. In his short application for exemption though, he wrote 
that “I have always been a pacifist and I have tried to define my pacifism in all my 
published and unpublished work.”21  
 
Tribunals of conscience 
The tribunal can be seen as a space where conscience gained definition and salience 
as an ethical category. It was at the tribunals that evidence was produced to back up 
applicants’ claims, and their conscience was formally validated, or not. Appearances 
were usually relatively short—typically around 20 minutes. Judges would ask 
applicants a series of questions about the grounds for their conscience, how long they 
had held it, and how they had followed it through.22 The tribunals were also public 
spaces, and even if they were not widely attended, they were reported on by the local 
press.  
The first time Urquhart appeared before a tribunal, the panel was headed by a 
senior Scottish lawyer, and included the Scottish philosopher and translator of Kant, 
Norman Kent Smith. Urquhart’s application was rejected.23 In its decision, the chair 
of the tribunal wrote that Urquhart “recognises no sense of obligation.”24 At the 
appeal, Urquhart was represented by a young lawyer called Gordon Stott. Stott was a 
socialist and pacifist. He was also registered as a conscientious objector, carrying out 
agricultural work as a form of alternative service. In 1940 Stott had been a practicing 
lawyer for only a few years, but in later life he would become one of the most 
influential Scottish legal figures of the second half of the twentieth century, working 
as the Scottish government’s chief legal officer and senior prosecutor. On Stott’s                                                         
21 Fred Urquhart, Application to Local Tribunal, June 6, 1940 (papers of Fred Urquhart, collection of 
Colin Affleck). 
22 “Conscientious Objector Tribunals,” 24 Feb. 1940, Mass Observation Archives (MOA) TC6, box 2, 
file A.; “Questions to COs,” June 1944, CBCO Archive, 2/32, Friends House; “Notebook of 
Instructions for Conscientious Objectors in Answering Tribunal Questions,” 1940, IWMA, misc. 3, 
hem 22. 
23 Fred Urquhart, Notification of decision of Local Tribunal, July 1940 (papers of Fred Urquhart, 
collection of Colin Affleck). 
24 Fred Urquhart, Report of Local Tribunal, July 18 1940 (papers of Fred Urquhart, collection of Colin 
Affleck). 
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advice, Urquhart took a friend as a witness to attest to his sincerity before the appeal 
tribunal.25 Despite his professed Communism, Urquhart applied for recognition as a 
conscientious objector on “humanitarian grounds,” although he did not explain what 
these were. The appeal tribunal, led by the aristocrat Lord Elphinstone, granted 
Urquhart exemption on the condition that he carried out agricultural work, and he 
spent the next few years working on a potato farm in Fife.26  
It was at the tribunal that conscience perhaps came most clearly into public 
view, as they were made legible to both the applicant and to other people. As ethical 
issues are made explicit, people are asked to give reasons and account for their 
positions (Mattingly 2014; Keane 2016). Cheryl Mattingly perceptively describes 
such processes of objectification, where a claimant is forced to look through the eyes 
of another to defend themselves after the act (2014). A claim of conscience might 
therefore be seen as a response to an objectifying legal demand. And, such 
objectification can, implicitly or explicitly, demand coherence for what might 
otherwise be a heterogeneous and ambivalent set of motivations, claims, and 
assumptions. 
However, although conscience was given shape at the tribunal, it is important 
to note though that it was not simply a top-down legal category. Michael Lambek has 
argued that under liberal regimes, objectified forms of ethics become “abstracted … 
something at arm’s length … rather than assimilated and embodied as part of life” 
(2015, 311). Such an argument, though, can ignore the ways in which legal practices 
can penetrate and be taken up in the most intimate of relations. If conscience was a 
legal black box that had to be filled, its form and meanings took shape within 
particular life trajectories. Urquhart’s diaries are full of reflections on conscience, and 
its implications for his wider social relationships, which although shaped in the 
context of the National Service (Armed Forces) Act, were not entirely subsumed by it.  
It would also be a mistake to see the word “conscience” simply as an 
instrumental device, deployed in order to gain exemption from military service. On 
reading Urquhart’s diaries, as with those of many other conscientious objectors, you 
do not get a sense of a calculating take on whether to make a claim. Instead, there is                                                         
25 Fred Urquhart, Report of Appellate Tribunal, November 7, 1940; letter from Gordon Stott, July 30, 
1940; letter from Gordon Stott to Fred Urquhart, August 2 1940 (papers of Fred Urquhart, collection of 
Colin Affleck). 
26 Fred Urquhart, Report of Appellate Tribunal, 7 November 1940 (papers of Fred Urquhart, collection 
of Colin Affleck). 
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much anxiety about both the consequences and the virtues of such an act.27 
Urquhart’s conscience was thick with value. 
Public claims of conscience were therefore not simply a response to top-down 
injunctions, a self-interested manipulation, or an embodied part of life. Instead, the 
ethical reflections called conscience took shape in the often awkward space between 
all three. Conscience emerged in the gap between personal hopes, fears, and 
aspirations, and the perceived demands of living with other people. But either way, as 
the next section will show, what counted as a persuasive conscience was never 
neutral. 
 
Recognition  
Recognition—of conscience or otherwise—is never a self-evident or transparent 
matter. Instead, it is marked by distinct histories through which the very object of 
recognition is shaped (Povinelli 2002; Markell 2003). Above all, social and cultural 
conventions play a central role in what is acknowledged as a genuine claim.  
Urquhart’s downplaying of left-wing ideology before the tribunal was 
probably very sensible. In theory, it was certainly possible for socialists to get 
exemption. The Glaswegian Communist, Victor Turner, who later went on to write 
The Forest of Symbols, for example, was registered as a noncombatant. More 
generally though, political objectors, and socialists in particular, had great difficulty 
before the tribunal. Fred Morel, for example, an East London activist for the 
Independent Labour Party, argued before the tribunal that “as a member of the 
working class it has been my firm conviction for the past sixteen year that war, but 
only increases the poverty, degradation, and misery of the working classes.”28 His 
application was rejected and he was sent to jail. He only won his appeal after his wife, 
against Morel’s wishes, but on the advice of fellow political activists, gave oral 
testimony that he “would not take up arms in any case for any reason.”29  
Most successful claims at the tribunal usually presented conscience as a form 
of obligation, and an obligation to fellow citizens in particular. As Erica Weiss has 
argued in relation to Israel, claims of conscience are most likely to be recognized                                                         
27 See, for example, Provisional Registration of Conscientious Objection, July 17, 1940. Papers of 
Cyril Wright, IWMA. 
28 Fred Morel, August 15, 1940. Application to the Local Tribunal of a Person Provisionally Registered 
in the Register of Conscientious Objectors. Papers of Fred Morel, IWM. 
29 Interview with Jenny Morel, September 3, 1980, IWMSA. 
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when they do not challenge prevailing state orthodoxies (2014). In mid-twentieth-
century Britain, a long-term affiliation with a pacifist group or church was most 
persuasive of all, with Quakers in particular representing the gold standard.30 Quakers 
seem to have been convincing partly because of their historical links with pacifism in 
the eyes of the wider public. The Quaker style of conscience openly acknowledged its 
duties to other British citizens. Urquhart, in contrast, was condemned at his first 
tribunal for having “no sense of obligation,” and was only granted exemption when he 
declared his humanitarian commitments and then agreed to take on agricultural work. 
The vast majority of claims were only accepted at the tribunal if the applicant agreed 
to undertake some form of service. Many conscientious objectors were more than 
happy to do so, taking on such positions as medical orderlies, forestry workers, and 
agricultural laborers.31  
Above all, the sense of obligation that marked most successful claims of 
conscience at the tribunal was understood in patriotic terms.32 Indeed, many 
conscientious objectors even saw their recognition as a product of a particularly 
British sensibility—echoing the ways in which members of the British government 
themselves understood the conscience clause. C. H. Smith, for example, wrote to a 
friend shortly before he appeared before a tribunal, “You know this is a remarkable 
country—so much so, that it is not easy to refuse the services they demand.”33  
 
Where is the politics? 
So where might we find the politics in the public consciences of pacifists such as 
Urquhart? Or rather, to put this another way, what forms of dissent and opposition did 
conscientious objection to taking up arms open up? The issue of who should serve in 
the armed forces, and who could refuse, could be understood as an issue of patriotism, 
forced labor, market efficiency, or class inequality, amongst others. But, in Second 
World War Britain it was predominantly dealt with as an issue of ethical reflection 
and sincere personal conviction. In making a claim to conscience, issues of class 
solidarity and exploitation, for example, were therefore left to one side. Just a month 
into the war, Urquhart would write in his diary that “If ever time was ripe for a 
revolution it is now … If only people would realise that Chamberlain and his gang are                                                         
30 Private papers of C. Worrall, IWMA. 
31 See for example, interview with Bernard Hicken, May 1992, IWMSA. 
32 See, for example, Ridgway, Diary, October 1, 1939, IWMA. 
33 Letter to George, dated April 16, 1943, private papers of C. H. Smith, IWMA. 
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every bit as bad as Hitler.”34 It goes without saying that such potentially disruptive 
arguments would have not got very far at the tribunal. Instead, his refusal to fight was 
publicly presented as an issue of individual scruples—and more specifically scruples 
that were widely (if not unproblematically) seen as particularly British.  
There were certainly attempts to refuse the consensual logic of conscience. 
However, the risk for those who did not present a respectable form of conscience—
and one that acknowledged patriotic obligations—was that they were jailed, or worse, 
simply ignored. Not all Christian belief was persuasive, for example. Jehovah’s 
Witnesses in particular could encounter problems for saying they would only 
participate in “Godly Wars,” raising questions about their loyalty to the British 
state.35 The threat of prison was a constant theme in Urquhart’s diaries. He would 
write to his publisher, that if he made the slightest public criticism of the military he 
was likely to be court martialed.36 Over the course of the war, around 5,000 people 
were criminally charged for refusing conscription. Anarchists in particular continued 
to agitate against conscription throughout the war, arguing that conscription was a 
form of slavery, and that revolution was the only way to end war (Graham 1943). 
They often promoted forms of opposition other than conscientious objection, such as 
a group of miners charged with a “work slow.”37 Such action often resulted in jail 
time. 
In partial contrast, for many women, the risk was that their opposition to war 
was simply not acknowledged as publicly significant. Urquhart’s close friend Mary 
Litchfield would have found it very difficult to apply for status as a conscientious 
objector, even if she had wanted to. Although Jenny Morel, for example, described 
herself as a stronger pacifist than her husband, and had tried to register as a 
conscientious objector, she was exempted due to her “domestic responsibilities.”38 
Throughout the Second World War, an estimated 911 women were granted status as 
conscientious objectors (Nicholson 2007). However, many others had great difficulty 
in having their claims taken seriously by government officials, and were simply 
redirected to alternative forms of labor. The Ministry of Labour claimed at one point 
                                                        
34 Diary, October 21, 1939, Urquhart. 
35 Bulletin of the Central Board for Conscientious Objectors April 1942, no. 26. 
36 Urquhart, Letter to Patrick Crichton-Stuart, September 19, 1939 (collection of Colin Affleck). 
37 War Commentary for Anarchism, mid-August 1944, 5, 20. 
38 Interview with Jenny Morel, IWMSA. 
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that women made up only 22 of the 60,000 British COs, although activists argue that 
they numbered in the thousands.39  
It was not just potentially disruptive claims of class and gender that were 
effectively pushed out of public recognition. Those people who did not align with 
dominant forms of British nationalism also faced difficulties in having their 
objections to fighting acknowledged. In Northern Ireland there was no conscription, 
for fear of provoking open rebellion. And both Welsh and Scottish Nationalists were 
sent to prison for refusing to be conscripted. Douglas Young, for example, who was 
the wartime leader of the newly formed Scottish National Party, spent several years in 
an Edinburgh jail. He refused to even apply for exemption on the grounds of 
conscience, implicitly claiming that the British state had no right to judge his 
convictions. Young argued that conscription was part of an “Imperial Policy” that 
trespassed on Scottish traditions of natural liberty. The magistrate hearing his appeal 
reportedly said that the “arguments are too lofty for this Court. If not for a 
psychiatrist…”40  
Turning war into an issue of conscience transforms the situation into one 
where what people have “in common” is the ability for individual ethical reflection 
(Rancière 2001). In doing so, the responsibility of identifying and solving social 
problems is displaced onto individuals. Max Weber famously saw pacifism as 
inherently non-political, as it refused to grapple with the use of violence ([1919] 
1948). At the same time though, as Erica Weiss also notes, the refusal of violence can 
also challenge the very legitimacy of the state (2014, 2016). But the framing of the 
question of who should fight in terms of individual scruples served to put arguments 
over legitimacy of violence to one side, in favor of a debate about the relative 
presence of sincere convictions. The publicly persuasive way of refusing to fight was 
treated as one of personal scruples, rather than collective solidarity, distribution, or 
even fairness and efficiency.  
The issue of refusing to fight was turned into one of what individuals thought 
they ought to do, in all “good conscience.” It is not just that responses to the problem 
of how we might live (and die) together were transformed into the sum of individual 
preferences. Equally importantly, the preferences that were given priority were those                                                         
39 Bulletin of the Central Board for Conscientious Objectors, May 1942, no. 27 
40 Douglas Young. 1944. An Appeal to Scots Honour: A Vindication of the Right of the Scottish 
People to Freedom from Industrial Conscription and Bureaucratic Despotism Under the Treaty of 
Union with England. Glasgow: Scottish Secretariat Limited. 
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that were presented as based on careful ethical contemplation, resonating with a 
particular British history of dissent and conviction. The conscience that was 
persuasively to the fore was personal, rather than critical of the state and its policies. 
In effect it said: “it is me, not you.” In practice, protecting conscience meant 
prioritizing the claims of respectable men.  
Conscientious objection therefore operated in the space expected, or even 
required, of loyal citizens. This is part of a tradition of conscience described by 
Michael Walzer as narrow and self-limiting (1970, 124–25). If politics is partly a 
matter of dissensus—that is, the disruption of hierarchies (Rancière 2001), conscience 
can be seen as a matter of consensus between loyal citizens who did not challenge 
why the war was being fought, or in whose name it was being carried out. In other 
words, publicly acknowledged claims of conscience have acted as an authorized form 
of dissent, rather than radical objection. 
 
Conclusion 
Talal Asad has argued that under “modern Christianity,” conscience became the “seat 
of self-government” through which believers address the question “What should I do 
if I am to do that which is good?” (1993, 245). But what happens in a nominally 
secular state when conscience becomes the basis for the public distribution of rights, 
duties, and entitlements? We might begin by noting the contingency of the question, 
in the sense that it is asked at all and the assumption that the answers that are given 
are significant to others (Geuss 2003, 32). And then we might ask what implications 
the valorization of such questions has for shaping who can respond and in what ways. 
Doing so helps us to understand the spaces that claims of conscience can open up—
and close down—for dissent, refusal, and objection. 
Under the right conditions, conscience might well have subversive potential 
(see, for example, King 1967). It could mark a space of refusal that generates new 
possibilities, with progressive or reactionary implications (Simpson 2014; 
McGranahan 2016). We can speculate that such radical forms of conscience are based 
on an already existing form of exclusion. However, demands for the public 
recognition of conscience—particularly, and perhaps somewhat ironically, when 
understood as an internal and free quality of individuals—can also reproduce social 
conventions about what conscience should look and sound like. Under such 
circumstances, conscience can work as a tightly circumscribed form of objection that 
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personalizes opposition and marks out a very narrow space for debate and dissension. 
As such, when liberal democracies protect freedom of conscience, they can protect a 
very limited type of activity.  
The public conscience of Second World War Britain treated the refusal to 
fight as an issue on personal integrity rather than a broader question of collective 
solidarity, distribution, patriarchy, or national self-determination. A narrow form of 
ethical reflection—associated with specific types of “respectable” men—became the 
privileged site through which the solution to social tensions were addressed, putting to 
one side collective responses and tensions over class, nation, and religion, amongst 
others. This was also a form of conscientious objection that was deeply loyal to the 
British state. Erica Weiss has shown that in Israel claims of conscience served to 
marginalize people from public moral debate (2014). In contrast, in Second World 
War Britain, arguments from conscience served to incorporate applicants into a 
broader public, where what people were felt to have in common was the ability to 
reflect on ethical issues. This is not conscience as a form of refusal—a rejection of the 
state and denial of its authority (Weiss 2016, 353; see also McGranahan 2016). 
Rather, it was a deliberate search for public recognition and acknowledgement, which 
took consent for granted. 
More broadly, if conscience is understood in terms of culturally thick social 
relationships, it can reproduce the very relationships through which it is formed. The 
opening up of spaces of reflection might well produce personal anxiety, irony, and 
conflicting ethical demands. But these spaces do not stand apart from the fabric of 
larger scale social relations. The social and public significance of ethical reflection is 
made, not simply found.  
Over seventy years after the end of the Second World War, there are still 
debates over whether to grant special protections to those who make claims in the 
name of conscience. However, rather than focusing on war and peace, it is abortion 
and same-sex marriage that seem to be the main issues of concern. Either way though, 
history suggests that turning abortion or same-sex marriage into issues of individual 
conscience will obscure questions of collective inequality and distribution. And, at the 
same time, the ways in which conscience is recognized will serve to reproduce narrow 
forms of privilege. Indeed, turning questions of sexual reproduction and equality into 
an issue of the ability to demonstrate tender scruples will inevitably put to one side 
questions of principle and mutual obligation. 
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The wider story of the anthropological turn to ethics is beyond the scope of 
this paper. However, although anthropologists found ethics relatively late in 
comparison to many other disciplines (see for example, Garber, Hanssen, Walkowitze 
2000), it can now sometimes seem that we are able to find ethics everywhere.  The 
turn to ethics has undoubtedly produced many important new insights about how we 
live together.  But in thinking through how our own intellectual histories, we might 
also note how starting with ethics, both ethnographically and analytically, can shift 
the focus of the questions that are asked about collective life. As Joel Robbins 
acknowledges, “the choices social scientists make about what to study … are always 
driven by the values they hold to be most important” (2013, 448). Before we take 
particular forms of ethics for granted, we also need to pay careful attention to the 
contingent role of ethical claims in different forms of social reproduction. In a now 
classic essay, the historian Eric Hobsbawm argued that the point of social history was 
not simply the recognition of previously ignored subjects, but the opportunities this 
produced for writing the history of society as a whole (1971). For Hobsbawm, this 
meant trying to link particular topics to bigger questions of social hierarchy. We 
might say something similar about the anthropology of ethics.  
Prioritizing ethical reflection in our own analysis can leave us relatively less 
well equipped to understand how such practices gain significance and for whom. Too 
narrow a focus is in danger of ignoring the conditions under which such forms of 
reflection reproduce particular social relations. It is one thing, as important as that 
might be, to note that ethical experiences cause personal anxiety and conflict. It is 
quite another to grasp the role that ethical reflection can have in identifying, 
discussing, and addressing what might be issues of mutual concern. The point here is 
not that people do or do not confront ethical issues, or ask themselves how they ought 
to live. People like Fred Urquhart clearly grappled deeply and profoundly with their 
senses of obligation—both to their own consciences and to others. But the wider 
public significance of the question of what they ought to do when asked to fight, for 
example, and the sense that the appropriate dissenting answer was marked by 
individual conscience, was not self-evident or inevitable. Rather, it emerged from 
within the broader tensions and inequalities of a society at war. We therefore need to 
pay attention to the history of how and why ethical reflection is given social 
significance, and the implications that this has for collective life. Rather than starting 
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with ethics, we might therefore begin by looking beyond the self-consciously ethical 
subject. 
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